BACKGROUND
• In the UK, the privatisation of utility industries has led to the development of regulatory regimes to prevent monopoly abuse • Issue is: how to set price cap (or rate of return) while preserving efficiency incentives (productive effciency) • Littlechild (1983) provides virtually no guidance as to how price caps should be reset after the completion of a regulatory period • One approach: base future revenue on the costs achieved by the firm in previous years, adjusted for any known exceptional items or expected cost changes.
• Incentives for cost efficiency?
BENCHMARKING
• Benchmarking (or 'yardstick competition'): compare the performance of a regulated firm with some comparator.
• Shleifer (1985) argued that a regulated firm's revenue needs should be assessed by looking at costs in comparable firms or industries. The objective should be to find 'some relatively simple benchmark, other than the firm's present or past performance, against which to evaluate the firm's potential'. • Shleifer's solution was to identify 'comparable firms to infer a firm's attainable cost level'. • Provided that the regulator has two or more firms under its jurisdiction, then yardstick competition can overcome information asymmetry. • Each regulated firm, i, is assigned a 'shadow firm'. The shadow firm becomes the benchmark for setting the revenue requirement.
• Benchmarking can provide regulators with information about efficient OPEX and CAPEX requirements, thereby reducing the regulated firm's informational rents.
• Benchmarking is now used extensively: for example in Costa Rica for transport tariff setting, in telecommunications regulation in Hungary, in Dutch electricity and telecommunicationS, and for electricity regulation in Norway and New South Wales • Benchmarking costs reduces the effects of the company's own costs on prices; in extremis, if a firm's costs have no effect on its own revenues, the incentives for management to reduce costs will be maximised.
• 'It is essential for the regulator to commit to not paying attention to firms' complaints and to be prepared to let the firms go bankrupt if they choose inefficient cost levels. Unless the regulator can credibly threaten to make inefficient firms lose money… cost reduction cannot be enforced' (Shleifer, p cit., p.323).
• Shleifer was also aware that this form of yardstick competition required a 'shadow firm' comparable in terms of its cost structure. The result would also be unreliable if the firms faced different demand functions; although for simplicity Shleifer assumes a common demand function for much of his analysis.
• To overcome the lack of a perfect 'shadow firm', Shleifer recognised that multivariate regression models would need to be developed to reflect characteristics that could account for cost differences between firms that are not within the control of management (e.g. topography, customer density, regional wage costs, etc.).
• Shleifer warns against the marginal cost of the exercise overwhelming its marginal benefit in terms of more accurate price setting. 
The UK Experience
• In the UK, benchmarking performance is now part of resetting regulatory price caps and is used to help determine appropriate X factors.
• Over time there appears to have been movement towards a more common approach to benchmarking across the regulatory officesthe result of increasing experience, Monopolies and Mergers Commission (now Competition Commission) investigations, demonstration effects and government policy that favours more consistency in regulation across the different regulatory bodies (DTI, 1998, para.80) . Nevertheless, some important differences remain.
• The regulatory offices undertake their own productivity and cost analyses and from time to time use research produced by (different) outside consultancy firms.
• Expert judgement also plays a part in efficiency assessment by the regulatory offices and the experts come from diverse backgrounds including industry and academia.
• There is, therefore, some heterogeneity in the approaches adopted by UK regulatory offices when setting price caps.
TELECOMMUNICATIONS
• At privatisation BT's price cap was based on discussion between the government, the company and the City. • NERA applied OLS, SFA and DEA methods to derive comparative measures. The results from these exercises were complemented by OFTEL's own performance estimates, including figures for market shares and domestic market growth within the UK. An interesting result of the exercise was the conclusion that UK interconnection charges and call tariffs were uncompetitive.
